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Social and Biological Constructions of Youth: 







¶1 SB 399 was a bill in California that would have permitted judges to review and 
reduce some sentences of life without the possibility of parole given to youth.  When the 
floor opened for debate on the bill, Republican Assembly Member Jim Nielson warned 
his colleagues about ―these children‖ whom he said he was loathe to even call children.
1
  
Two months earlier at an appropriations hearing on the same subject, Nielson had 
described ―these individuals‖ in even harsher terms: ―They are not youngsters.  They are 
not kids.  They are hardened criminals.  It‘s a tragedy and I‘ve wept about what happened 
to them, their broken hearts that have gotten them on this path, what got them there.  But 
they are evil.‖
2
  By contrast, Democratic Assembly Member Mariko Yamada spoke of 
one youth who was sentenced to remain in prison forever in a decidedly different way: 
―He looked at me as someone who'd been thrown away, perhaps by his family, perhaps 
by society, perhaps by the community.‖
3
 
¶2 This Article explores such conflicting rhetoric regarding youth who commit crimes.  
Although SB 399 concerned youth whose serious offenses mostly involve homicide, 
discourse on juvenile crime and delinquency in general is wrought with competing 
constructions of youth-gone-bad and youth in serious need of help, care, and protection.  
Two votes shy of passage, SB 399 surfaced a veritable fight that underscores how some 
opponents continue to frame the issue of juvenile crime in terms that ―adultify‖ and 
frequently de-humanize youth.  This framework persists no matter how conservative 
policy is crafted, no matter the individual circumstances of a youth, and no matter the 
evidence that youth are different from adults.  
¶3 The premise of this Article is that youth is a fluid concept, as is race.  Within the 
juvenile justice system, youth is thus a construct that is subject to interpretation, 
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including through the lens of race.  The fluid and racially informed constructions of youth 
existed when society first developed an understanding of the age group.  Such 
constructions persist today in shaping the juvenile justice system, which over-selects for 
youth of color at every stage of its process.  The legal and political implications of such 
dueling narratives for youth justice are far-reaching. 
¶4 Part I of the Article establishes different social understandings of youth, and shows 
how such narratives may overlay conscious and unconscious racial biases to disadvantage 
youth of color.  Part II explores biological definitions of adolescence, born anew by 
advances in brain imaging technology and also giving way to diverging constructions of 
youth.  Part III examines how these narratives, whether socially or biologically defined, 
have historically stratified and continue to bifurcate young people by race into two tracks 
of justice.   
¶5 Part IV notes the particular dangers arising from biological or brain-based 
arguments about adolescent capacity in the context of juvenile justice advocacy.  Other 
critiques have emerged in recent years to temper the potential misuse of neuroscience by 
lawyers, as well as to correct misunderstandings by judges and jurors.
4
  Much of the 





 and specific individuals.
7
  This Article 
examines and raises concerns about the implications of such science for youth justice and 
racial equity. 
¶6 In the final analysis, both social and biological constructs of youth are prone to 
racial bias.  However, biological constructions of youth may be especially harmful in 
perpetuating associations among inborn criminality, incapacity, and race—in a society 
where such associations already exist, in a system disproportionately populated by youth 
of color, and in light of a history of racialized, deterministic science.  Such constructions 
of race and youth work hand-in-hand to steer decision-makers towards control and 
containment, rather than protect-and-nurture approaches to justice-involved youth.  From 
youth who are truant, get in fist fights, or dabble in drug use, to those who commit acts of 
violence and have the most urgent, complex needs, policymakers and the public have 
been intolerant of and quick to arrest and lock up youth of color especially, who they 
view as surely corrupt, hopeless, or undeserving of help.  With one in three young black 
men currently in prison, in jail, on probation or parole in the United States,
8
 perceptions 
                                                 
4
 See, e.g., Owen D. Jones et al., Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed, 2009 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 5, n.18, available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/jones-brain-imaging.pdf.  
5
 See, e.g., id. ¶ 27 (―All behavior results from the interaction of genes, environments (including social 
contexts), developmental history, and the evolutionary processes that built the brain to function in the way 
it does.‖); Steven K. Erikson, Blaming the Brain, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 27, 28 (2010) (―Instead of 
people, cognitive neuroscience posits brains as the exclusive agents of behavior and suggests brains are 
incapable of blame because of their mechanical and determined nature.‖). 
6
 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 4, ¶ 31 (―There is more to a thought than blood flow and oxygen.  fMRI is 
very good at discovering where brain tissue is active . . . .  But differences are not thoughts.‖); Erikson, 
supra note 5, at 42 (challenging the assertion that ―all individual thoughts, emotions, and feelings can be 
traced to certain defined biological locations of the brain‖). 
7
 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 4, ¶ 33 (―Most brain imaging research is directed toward understanding how 
the average brain, within a subject population, is activated during different tasks.‖).  
8
 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:  MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 9 
(2010).  
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and treatment of youth of color are urgent matters.  Indeed, how youth are constructed is 
every bit a part of understanding this nation‘s mass incarceration of people of color. 
II. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF YOUTH 
¶7 Until about 1830, social institutions regarded children primarily as property of their 
parents and a source of cheap labor.
9
  The notion of ―childhood‖ or ―adolescence‖ as a 
distinct stage of life or a social category that afforded political and social rights was 
nonexistent.
10
  In the early nineteenth century, however, factors including increased 
urbanization, a growing middle class, industrialization and Transcendentalism
11
 birthed 
new attitudes about children and society‘s obligations to them.
12
  Childhood became 
associated with learning and development, as well as a kind of fragility, innocence, and 
vulnerability. 
¶8 Professor Kenneth Nunn asserts that youth have been defined as ―other than adult, 
and by their construction, they also produce the meaning of adulthood.‖
13
  The meaning 
of their ―otherness‖ is both self-created and produced by adults who define the rules and 
conditions of their growing up.
14
  The positive expression of this otherness treats children 
as ―inchoate adults, as beings with great potential that should be nurtured and developed‖ 
and as ―trusting, loving, malleable and dependent.‖
15
  The negative expression of this 
otherness sees children as ―a drain on scarce resources‖ and as lacking good, rational 
judgment.
16
  For each expression, control is often important as a means to discipline, 
develop, and contain youth; to be sure, ―otherness‖ may signal threat—whether because 
of youths‘ predilection for social experimentation, growing independence, sexual 
awakenings, or other hallmarks characteristic of the life stage. 
¶9 In keeping with these dual notions, the concept of ―children‘s rights‖ emerged in 
the middle of the nineteenth century with two meanings:  
On the one hand, the expression referred to the notion that children had 
special needs and interests that adults had an obligation to protect.  
Children . . . were fragile, vulnerable, and malleable creatures who 
required proper nurture, protection, play, schooling, and time to mature.  
On the other hand, the phrase children‘s rights also suggested that children 
had a distinctive personhood and unique legal identity and status, separate 
                                                 
9
 Kenneth B. Nunn, The Child as Other: Race and Differential Treatment in the Juvenile Justice System, 51 
DEPAUL L. REV. 679, 679 (2002). 
10
 Id.; see also Steven Mintz, Placing Children’s Rights in Historical Perspective, 44 NO. 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 
2 (2008). 
11
 Transcendentalism is ―a system of philosophy that emphasizes intuition as a means of knowing a spiritual 
reality and believes that divinity pervades nature and humanity. It is especially associated with Ralph 




 Id.; see also Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court—Part II: Race and the "Crack 
Down" on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 331–32 (1999). 
13






 Id. at 702. 
Vol. 6:2] Patricia Soung 
431 




This appreciation for children and youths‘ agency and personhood existed alongside, and 
at times wrestled with, recognition of their vulnerability.  Indeed a century after a 
discernible children‘s rights movement emerged, efforts to entrust young people with 
power continued to meet resistance and ambivalence in policy making and public debate.  
Advocates in the 1960s and early 1970s themselves continued to defend and elaborate on 
children‘s rights on grounds of both competence and immaturity.  At the same time, 




¶10 In recent decades, variable constructions of youth have found new fuel in mass 
media and consequent policymaking.  While contending that youth are individuals 
deserving of rights, the autonomous view of youth has also slid all too readily into 
rhetoric that some youth have forsaken their rights only by their own treacherous doing.  
While reifying children as the promise of the future, rhetoric around youth also has 
projected fear, as typified by news reports in the 1980s and 1990s pronouncing an 
imminent tidal wave of teen ―superpredators.‖
19
  Congress was one of the first to respond 
with the passage of the Gun-Free Schools Act (GFSA) in 1994, requiring schools in 
states that received federal funding to expel students possessing a firearm on school 
grounds for at least one year, refer students caught with a weapon to the juvenile justice 
system, and permit adjustment to the expulsion requirement only on a case-by-case 
basis.
20
  State and local governments quickly followed suit.  By 1997, 94 percent of 
schools had adopted zero-tolerance policies that stiffened punishment for conduct well 
beyond what the GFSA contemplated; schools began to allow SWAT-style raids in 
response to suspected student drug possession,
21
 and arrested or suspended students in 
growing numbers, some as young as six years old, for typical misbehavior or even 
innocuous behavior like passing gas.
22
  Political fervor and public demand for ―get 
tough‖ approaches to violent crime also ushered in automatic transfer and direct file 
legislation easing the process and criteria for states to try and sentence youth as adults.  
                                                 
17
 Mintz, supra note 10, at 2–3. 
18
 Id. at 10. 
19
 A 1996 Newsweek headline story proposed that drastic measures be taken to contain these ―vicious‖ 
youth.  Peter Annin, ‘Superpredators’ Arrive, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, 1996, at 57.  In testimony before the 
Senate, academic and current director of the Partnership for Research on Religion and At-Risk Youth, John 
J. Dilulio, Jr., focused on two solutions to an alleged rise in youth violence—churches and prisons—and 
advocated for the construction of more juvenile prisons to contain these ―superpredators,‖ who are ―born of 
abject ‗moral poverty.‘‖  The Changing Nature of Youth Violence: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Youth 
Violence of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 23, 24 (1996) (prepared statement of John J. 
Dilulio, Jr., Fill Churches, Not Jails: Youth Crime and Superpredators); see also Dia N. Brannen et al., 
Transfer to Adult Court: A National Study of How Juvenile Court Judges Weigh Pertinent Kent Criteria, 12 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‘Y & L. 332, 333 (2006). 
20
 See KIM BROOKS, VINCENT SCHIRALDI, & JASON ZEIDENBERG, JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, CHILDREN‘S 
LAW CENTER, SCHOOL HOUSE HYPE: TWO YEARS LATER 26 (2000), available at  
http://www.justicepolicy.org/reports/report-j-hype-full.html. 
21
 See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN: THE SCHOOLHOUSE TO THE JAILHOUSE 
TRACK 16–19 (2005). 
22
 See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, TEST, PUNISH, AND PUSH-OUT: HOW ZERO TOLERANCE AND HIGH-STAKES 
TESTING FUNNEL YOUTH INTO THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 13 (2010). 
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By the late 1990s, every state in the country had adopted such laws in some form,
23
 for 
instance, by reducing the minimum age for transfer from juvenile to adult criminal court, 
expanding the list of transfer eligible offenses or easing the process for waiving youths by 
eliminating previously considered criteria.
24
  Alongside mandatory minimum sentencing, 
―three strikes‖ laws and other aggressive measures in the name of the ―War on Drugs,‖ 




¶11 Across the board, such tough-on-crime laws have disproportionately reined youth 
of color into the juvenile and criminal justice system.  Professor Barry Feld argues that at 
the get-go, the protect-and-nurture ideology of social and legal institutions in the 
nineteenth century began primarily for white children.
26
  Post-slavery, black children 
retained their status as property and continued to lack legal rights.
27
  Their primary social 
function was to provide labor for the economic welfare of white people.  As a 
consequence, ―there was no beginning of adolescence for African American youth.‖
28
  Or 
at least they were excepted from the conception of youth as innocent babes to be 
protected and nurtured into citizens afforded a full array of political, economic and social 
rights.  As explored further in section IV, outcomes in the juvenile justice system suggest 
that black youth are disproportionately denied their status as children, in the same way 
that they were more than a century ago.  
III. BIOLOGICAL DEFINITIONS OF YOUTH 
¶12 Like social constructions of youth, a growing body of neuroscience has defined 
youth as other-than-adult as a biological matter.
29
  In the last decade or so, new imaging 
technologies have been able to map the development of the human brain from childhood 
to adulthood.
30
  Advances in brain imaging technology have led to two major discoveries 
about the process and pace by which adolescent brains develop relative to adult brains.
31
  
                                                 
23
 BARRY HOLMAN & JASON ZEIDENBERG, JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, THE DANGERS OF DETENTION: THE 
IMPACT OF INCARCERATING YOUTH IN DETENTION AND OTHER SECURE FACILITIES 12 (2006).  
24
 Brannen, supra note 19, at 332–33. 
25
 See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 21, at 15. 
26
 Feld, supra note 12, at 332–33. 
27
 Nunn, supra note 9, at 680.   
28
 Id. at 679.   
29
 See, e.g., Donna M. Bishop & Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal Significance of Adolescent 
Developmental Capacities with the Legal Rights Provided by In Re Gault, 60 RUTGERS L.  REV. 125, 152 
(2007) (―Advances in neuroscience have produced a new body of knowledge showing that fundamental 
differences in the psychosocial maturity of adolescents and adults are rooted in biochemical changes in the 
structures and processes of the brain.‖).   
30
 See Mary Beckman, Crime, Culpability and the Adolescent Brain, 305 SCI. MAG. 596, 596 (2004); see 
also NAT‘L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, NIH PUB. NO. 01-4929, TEENAGE BRAIN: A WORK IN PROGRESS 
(2001). 
31
 Brain imaging technology includes computed tomography (CT) scanning that show structural 
abnormalities in the body, PET scanning which captures radioactive tracers moving through the 
bloodstream to learn about how the brain functions, EEG and MEG recordings of electromagnetic 
fluctuations in various parts of the brain, and fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) which detects 
changes in the properties of the brain while a subject is performing very specific mental tasks.  See Jones et 
al., supra note 4, ¶¶ 13–16.  fMRI is the newest technology that sheds light on how the brain works, how 
much, and for how long during particular tasks.  Id. ¶¶ 17–18.  
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First, the adolescent brain experiences an intense overproduction of ―gray matter,‖ 
material responsible for thought.
32
  The brain then undergoes ―pruning,‖ a process in 
which the brain rapidly eliminates gray matter; it then goes through ―myelination,‖ which 
produces insulation called white matter and makes the brain more efficient and precise.
33
  
Second, the frontal lobe—the part of the brain associated with cognitive reasoning—
undergoes more change during adolescence than during any other stage of life.
34
  The 
frontal lobe is also the last region of the brain to develop.
35
 
¶13 Interpretations of adolescent brain science differ among neuroscientists, 
psychiatrists, psychologists and other health care professionals, and few, if any, 
researchers have gone so far as to claim that biology alone explains the mind and 
behavior of teenagers.
36
  Notwithstanding its praise of advances in brain imaging 
technology, the National Institute of Mental Health has cautioned, ―Individual brains 
differ enough that only broad generalizations can be made from comparisons of different 
individuals at different ages.‖
37
  The Institute further acknowledges that ―both genes and 
environment play major roles in shaping early brain developments‖ and that researchers 




¶14 Still, many youth advocates are offering neuroscience, sometimes by itself and 
sometimes along with behavioral and social science, to show that youth are not yet fully 
formed, cognitively and psychosocially, relative to adults.  They use the technology to 
prove that the structure and activity of the ―average‖ teenager‘s brain is different from 
that of adults, and by extension, that the average teenager‘s cognitive and social behavior 
is different as well.  National Institute of Health psychiatrists, for instance, have written 
that the new brain research ―confirms a long-held, common sense view: teenagers are not 
the same as adults in a variety of key areas such as the ability to make sound judgments 
when confronted by complex situations, the capacity to control impulses, and the ability 
to plan effectively.‖
39
  Their article further concludes that neuroscience affirms youth‘s 
need for caring adults and institutions to help them learn and mature.
40
  
¶15 Other researchers have studied the brain in the context of trauma and other 
environmental ―risk factors‖ given its plasticity during early childhood and adolescence.  
For example, psychiatrist Bruce Perry has concluded that chronic stress or trauma can 
lead to neurochemical changes that affect attention, impulse control, sleep and motor 
                                                 
32
 See Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and Adolescence: A Longitudinal MRI 
Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861, 861 (1999) (discussing a National Institute of Mental Health 
longitudinal study of 145 children and adolescents).  
33
 Id. at 862–63. 
34
 See Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain Maturation in Frontal and 
Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859 (1999); see also Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping 
Continued Brain Growth and Gray Matter Density Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: Inverse 
Relationships During Postadolescent Brain Maturation, 21 J. NEUROSCIENCE 8819 (2001). 
35
 Id.   
36
 See Jones et al., supra note 4.  
37
 NAT‘L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 30, at *1.  
38
 Id.  
39
 DANIEL R. WEINBERGER, BRITTA ELVEVAG, & JAY N. GLEDD, THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN: A WORK IN 
PROGRESS 19 (2005). 
40
 Id. 





  Perry has specifically observed how non-responsive or threatening treatment 
can impair a child‘s ability to form healthy relationships,
42
 and how exposure to violence 
can numb a youth‘s capacity for remorse or empathy when he hurts or even kills another 
person.
43
  Undergirding Perry‘s developmental trauma research is a ―use it or lose it‖ 
principle—that is, brains become ―wired‖ within a certain time period and in the absence 




¶16 As with social constructions, biological narratives of youth may stand in tension 
with one another.  One narrative suggests that adolescents are inchoate beings, capable 
while changing and developing and that society‘s duty is to protect and nurture them.  
Another narrative describes youth as hard-wired during this formative stage of life; a too-
late mentality here concentrates societal resources and energy on early childhood 
interventions and control, containment, and zero tolerance of older youth. 
¶17 As discussed in the next section, constructions of youth are too often formulated 
along racial lines in the context of juvenile justice.  Biological and medical explanations 
of adolescent behavior and capacity are particularly deleterious for youth of color.  When 
combined with racial bias and the fact that youth of color are over-represented in the 
juvenile justice system, biological definitions of youth may reinforce notions of 
criminality and incapacity as inborn, natural, and inevitable.   
IV. RACIAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF YOUTH IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 
¶18 This section argues that juvenile justice systems have always treated and continue 
to treat youth differently based on competing and ultimately racialized narratives of 
―youth.‖  Whether supported by social or biological evidence, conceptions of youth in the 
United States have often emerged unevenly for different races and ethnicities, classes, 
genders, and sexualities.  This Article focuses only on the intersection of youth and race 
in the juvenile justice system and the fluidity of ―youth‖ as a legal identifier.  Ultimately, 
the individual rights-based and race-neutral frameworks that govern our laws, policies, 
and practices have failed to defend and support youth of color who are too systematically 
subjected to racial biases in the justice system. 
A. Racial Disparities in Juvenile Justice 
¶19 Juvenile courts first emerged as part of the Progressive Movement, ignited by 
modernization and industrialization at the turn of the twentieth century, and driven by an 
agenda to reform social and economic problems through government intervention.  The 
power of the state served as the movement‘s mantra and thus clothed the impulse to 
protect and develop children in institutional reforms such as child labor laws, social 
                                                 
41
 BRUCE D. PERRY, THE NEUROARCHEOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD MALTREATMENT: THE 
NEURODEVELOPMENTAL COSTS OF ADVERSE CHILDHOOD EVENTS (2000). 
42
 BRUCE D. PERRY, VIOLENCE AND CHILDHOOD: HOW PERSISTING FEAR CAN ALTER THE DEVELOPING 
CHILD‘S BRAIN (2001). 
43
 BRUCE D. PERRY, INCUBATED IN TERROR: NEURODEVELOPMENTAL FACTORS IN THE ‗CYCLE OF 
VIOLENCE‘ (1997). 
44
 See William T. Greenough, James E. Black & Christopher S. Wallace, Experience and Brain 
Development, 58 CHILD DEV. 539 (1987). 
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¶20 The juvenile court also developed amidst Transcendentalism and ―positive 
criminology,‖ schools of thought that spawned scientific and medical strategies to 
addressing crime.  Progressive reformers challenged the attribution of criminal behavior 
to choice and free will, qualified individual responsibility for crime, and shifted the 
analysis of crime towards external and deterministic influences.
46
  These reformers relied 
on a philosophy of diagnosis and treatment in emphasizing rehabilitation and reform, 
rather than punishment and retribution.
47
  They also conceived juvenile courts as an 




¶21 Guided by a mission to rehabilitate, the juvenile court adopted at least two guiding 
principles.  First, it considered youth to be reason for reduced culpability, though the 
court also avoided abdicating youth of total responsibility, recognizing that older youth, 
in particular, ―possess sufficient moral reasoning, cognitive capacity, and volitional 
control to hold them partially responsible for their behavior, albeit not to the same degree 
as adults.‖
49
  Second, the court declared itself parens patriae, or ―father of the people,‖ to 
intervene as a parental figure to determine what it deemed to be ―in the best interests of 
the child,‖ as opposed to the ―expressed interests‖ of a client in the criminal justice 
system.
50
  These principles endowed the juvenile court with flexibility and wide 
discretion in responding to criminal as well as non-criminal behavior, such as smoking, 
sexual activity, and truancy.
51
  In contrast to criminal courts, juvenile courts adopted 
informal processes, excluded lawyers and juries, and conducted confidential hearings.
52
  
In this manner, the courts joined other state-sanctioned institutions, including the child 
welfare system and public schools, to ―rescue‖ youth, teaming up with social workers, 
clinicians and probation officers to carry out its mission.  This flexible and informal 
design to mete out remedies for youth acknowledged the importance of individualized 
determinations to meet the needs of youth.  It also acknowledged the malleability of 
youth and embodied a hope and belief that youth could be taught, righted and reformed.  
¶22 Yet, whether at its inception or over time, the juvenile court system mirrored 
broader children‘s rights discourse and society at-large in conceiving two views of 
youth—as innocent, vulnerable, and dependent on the state for nurture and protection, 
and as crafty, autonomous almost-adults whose delinquent or criminal behavior threatens 
the public.
53
  In the end, while professing protection and rehabilitation as its ideals, the 
juvenile court has been ambivalent about whom it is actually protecting—youth from 
society and its vices, or society from youth and their vices.  This ambivalence and 
conflict within ―jurisprudence of youth‖ has allowed policymakers to inconsistently adopt 
                                                 
45
 Feld, supra note 12, at, 334–35. 
46
 Id. at 335–36. 
47
 Id. at 339. 
48
 See id. at 337–38.  
49
 See id. at 384; see also Nicholas Espiritu, (E)racing Youth: The Racialized Construction of California’s 
Proposition 21 and the Development of Alternate Contestations, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 189, 201 (2005). 
50
 Feld, supra note 12, at 337. 
51
 See generally Mintz, supra note 10. 
52
 Id.  
53
 Id.   
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philosophies of leniency, treatment and rehabilitation or severity and punishment.  The 
results are racially stratified.  At their inception, juvenile courts would ―order[] more 




¶23 The same flexibility and discretion nominally intended to better equip juvenile 
courts to protect and rehabilitate children has also punished ―other‖ children 
disproportionately and more harshly.  As judges lose discretion to prosecutors, legislators 
and law enforcement, racial bias has increased opportunities to infect the juvenile and 
criminal justice systems.  Studies today regularly confirm that at every stage of the 
juvenile justice system,
55
 black, Latino, and Native American youth receive harsher 
treatment than do white youth; they are more likely to be arrested, charged, detained, 
sentenced severely, and tried as adults.
56
  These racial disparities in the juvenile justice 
system have been traced to discretionary decisions made early in the juvenile justice 
process and ―build as the process continues.‖
57
  For example, a study of pretrial 
detentions in one state showed that the differential treatment of juveniles is attributable to 
both individual characteristics of the juveniles and the context in which the court 
operates, namely the racial composition of a county.
58
  Counties with higher percentages 
of non-white populations were more likely to detain juveniles prior to adjudication.
59
  
Ultimately, the decision to detain a youth appears ―rooted in notions of protecting either 
the community or the youth, providing proper placement when juvenile delinquents lack 
it, and/or to ensure court appearance.‖
60
  Black youth also shoulder the heaviest burden of 
punitive transfer laws.  Decisions to transfer juveniles to the adult system reflect the 
penultimate too-late mentality; symbolically, they represent ―a revocation of child‘s 
status as a juvenile‖ and an abandonment of the rehabilitation ideal that birthed the 
juvenile justice system.
61
  Substantively, transfers deny youth the protections and 
supports that are supposed to exist in the juvenile justice system, while subjecting them to 
harsher treatment in the criminal justice system.
62
  In comparison to youth who are 
processed in the juvenile system, transferred youth receive stiffer sentences, including 
                                                 
54
 Nunn, supra note 9, at 707.  
55
 Juvenile courts usually involve six stages, several of which may be combined—intake, detention, 
petitioning, waiver, adjudication, and disposition. 
56
 Nunn, supra note 9, at 681–82.  
57
 Id. at 687.  
58
 Gaylene S. Armstrong & Nancy Rodriguez, Effects of Individual and Contextual Characteristics on 
Preadjudication Detention of Juvenile Delinquents, 22 JUST. Q. 522 (2005).   
59
 Id. at 534.  Although some studies have found that the nature of the offense, prior record and probation 
violations are stronger predictors of detention status than race, other researchers have firmly concluded 
both the race and gender of a juvenile affects his or her detention status.  Id. at 522.  Data shows that non-
white males and females are detained at similar rates, whereas white males are more likely to be detained 
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 and little or no education or rehabilitative programming.
64
  Even 
Congress expressed concern over racial disparity in the juvenile justice system by passing 
mandates in 1992 under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act to require 
states to study and address disproportionate minority confinement.
65
  
B. Discretion and Bias in Racially-neutral Decision-making 
¶24 Decisions about whether to treat, protect or punish youth become susceptible to 
preexisting notions of threat, danger, and irresponsibility that have historically been 
attached to black youth in particular.  Indeed, social scientists confirm that race 
influences, consciously or unconsciously, perceptions of capacity,
66
 dangerousness and 
blameworthiness.
67
  One study found that system officials may have different theories 
about the causes of crime for blacks and whites, and such logic ultimately directs the 
disposition of an offender.
68
  In that study, probation officers ―consistently portray black 
youths differently than white youths in their written court reports, more frequently 
attributing blacks' delinquency to negative attitudinal and personality traits‖ while 
―depictions of white youths more frequently stress the influence of the individual's social 
environment.‖
69
  The varying attributions significantly affect assessments of a youth‘s 
risk of re-offending and sentence recommendations, even after adjusting for legally 
relevant case and offender characteristics.
70
  Ultimately, harsher penalties are meted out 




¶25 Such decisions touched by racial bias disproportionately cast aside youth of color 
as miniature-adults—forgetting or dismissing their status as children.  Another study 
confirms that unconscious racial stereotypes may influence judgments about young 
offenders' negative traits, culpability, risk of recidivism and deserved punishment.
72
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Such associations between race, immaturity and blameworthiness have invigorated tough 
responses to juvenile crime, including relaxed standards for waiver to criminal court.
73
  
Black youth, in particular, have been disproportionately transferred to criminal court, 
likely in part because they trigger the belief that the system should treat them not as 
redeemable youth, but hardened criminals who are just as blameworthy as adults who 
commit similar offenses. 
¶26 Besides individual characteristics, research also shows that juvenile courts in areas 
characterized by urbanization, racial inequality and poverty, high rates of violent crime or 
high proportions of minorities and youth ―process cases more formally, use detention 
more frequently, and impose harsher dispositions, especially for minority youths.‖
74
  
Though not conclusive, the evidence also suggests in these same areas where minorities 
are often highly visible, ―youths of color are perceived by justice officials—and perhaps 
by the community at large—as especially needy, especially threatening, or both.‖
75
  
Perceptual bias and racial coding, therefore, also combine with structural disadvantages 
to further strip poor black youth in high-crime, segregated urban neighborhoods of their 
juvenile status, and expose them to harsher penalties and secure confinement. 
¶27 Efforts to formalize and standardize juvenile proceedings, partly for the sake of 
uniformity in decision-making, have failed to protect youth of color from perceptual bias.  
Advocates express continued disappointments about inadequate due process rights for 
youth, even after In re Gault, the milestone case that afforded youth in juvenile 
delinquency proceedings many of the same procedural rights as adults.
76
  Youth of color 
continue to suffer disproportionately and more severely along all points of the justice 
process, where racial bias can produce worse outcomes for them and is hard or nearly 
impossible to prove.  Ultimately, the outcomes for youth of color in the juvenile justice 
system seem consistently worse whether procedures are informal or formal.  Without 
explicitly confronting racial biases that overlay any procedural fix, such disparities and 
inequities are likely to persist.  
V. BIOLOGIZING YOUTH AND RACE IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 
¶28 While acknowledging the value added by science to legal arguments, this section 
argues that reliance on neuroscience to explain adolescent cognition and behavior is 
subject to misinterpretation, misuse and even abuse.  More than one hundred years of 
legal recognition by juvenile courts and age-based laws already stand behind the 
foundational claim that recent adolescent neuroscience makes: youth are different.  Yet, 
children‘s advocates have found themselves needing to reassert this difference so that 
youth continue to receive special protections and relative leniency in the criminal justice 
system.  In arguing for developmentally informed treatment though, advocates should be 
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wary of the risks and unintended consequences of biological explanations of age and 
delinquent and criminal behavior.  
¶29 In recent years, the Supreme Court has acknowledged developmental differences 
between youth and adults in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence governing harsh 
sentences.  Its landmark decision in Roper v. Simmons ruled the death penalty 
unconstitutional for youth under eighteen years old, reasoning that their developmental 
immaturity, vulnerability to negative influence and transient characters render them 
―categorically less culpable.‖
77
  In doing so, the decision further fanned the popularity 
and hope surrounding neuroscience as a new arsenal in juvenile justice.
78
  Relying in part 
on biological and social science research,
79
 the Court held that ―[t]he differences between 
juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a 
youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability.‖
80
  More 
recently, the Court in Graham v. Florida banned life without the possibility of parole 
sentences for youth under eighteen years old who did not commit homicide.
81
  The Court 
reiterated the important principle established in Roper that a child is different than an 
adult, and though ―not absolved of responsibility for his action . . . his transgression ‗is 
not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.‘‖
82
  Though it is unclear to what extent 
neuroscience played a role in the Court‘s holding, both the Roper and Graham Courts 
relied heavily in their reasoning on youth being a distinct development phase to reach 
their holdings.  
¶30 Stephen Harper, the capital defense attorney who coordinated efforts to abolish the 
juvenile death penalty, observed that neuroscience is attractive to advocates because it is 
―hard evidence‖ of youths‘ cognitive and behavioral capacities, as opposed to common 
sense or soft evidence from behavioral and social science studies that predated Roper by 
decades.
83
  Indeed since the 1990s, a veritable field of ―neurolaw‖ has emerged, fusing 
neuropsychology with the legal system to, among other goals, modify criminal law 
doctrine and inform debates about culpability and responsibility.
84
  
¶31 The problems with neurolaw are many.  Interpretations and applications of 
neuroscience may ―medicalize‖ a state through which every person passes as they age.  In 
this respect, interpretations of the science is too often laden with deficits-language, even 
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describing ―youth‖ as a form of mental deficiency.  Moreover, the application of 
neuroscience to a juvenile and criminal justice system disproportionately populated by 
people of color perpetuates and naturalizes associations between race, criminality and 
intellect.  In the end, ―biologizing‖ youth and race in the same moment distracts from a 
fuller social understanding of how youth, race and context interact, and what measures 
should be taken to address youth crime and racial inequity. 
A. Youth as a Condition 
¶32 Many lawyers and legal groups have adopted neural scientific findings to contend 
that youth have a natural and special capacity for reform given the immense 
developmental changes they undergo.  Some advocates have also cloaked the findings in 
deficit terms.  For example, the American Bar Association reports that adolescents have 
―significant neurological deficiencies that result in stark limitations of judgment.‖
85
  
Mental health professionals explain in their Roper v. Simmons brief to the Supreme Court 
that the difference between the adolescent and adult brain is a function of ―deficiencies in 
the way adolescents think.‖
86
  Add to their incomplete biological make-up the stresses of 
being teenagers—including emotional angst and peer pressures—and the researchers find 
that ―the deficiencies in the adolescent mind and emotional and social development are 
especially pronounced.‖
87
  In the justice system specifically, youth are found on average 
to ―function at a substandard level.‖
88
  
¶33 The deficits framework understands youth in the juvenile justice system to be 
under-developed, incapable or even ill.  The fact of offending and consequent punishment 
is somehow a natural consequence of the youths‘ own deficiencies.  Yet studies for 
decades demonstrate that who enters the juvenile and criminal justice system is highly 
defined by poverty and race.  Psychologist Jerome Kagan points out that teen violence 
and murder rates vary drastically from country to country, although adolescent brains 
presumably develop at around the same rate worldwide; Kagan maintains that brain 
development must be understood in a cultural and historical context.
89
 
¶34 Even where deficits understandings are avoided, the danger in using biology to help 
explain youth delinquency and crime is that the focus remains largely on the adolescent 
as the site of damage, sometimes to the exclusion of the broader social context.  With its 
fancy graphics and technology, brain science can be hypnotizing, and may direct too 
much attention on individual treatment and solutions; the preoccupation with such 
science may thus undermine diagnosis of crime to some debatable degree as a public 
health epidemic influenced by poverty, failing public schools, depressed job markets and 
pervasive violence in and out of homes.  Indeed, at a recent symposium, a psychiatrist 
from Northwestern University School of Medicine posed the question, ―Where in the 
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brain is violence?,‖ and offered ―medications for violence‖ as one possible treatment for 
youth who show ―risks of violence.‖
90
  The very question presumes that brain structure 
and composition is key to understanding and consequently addressing violence.
91
  Yet 
scholars assert that no brain structure or set of brain structures are specifically responsible 
for criminal or law-abiding behavior, which are socially determined categorizations.
92
  
Correlation is still not causation.  So, for instance, even though 70 percent of inmates on 
death row for homicide may have atypical brain activation in a given region compared to 
non-incarcerated subjects, the statistic can mean many things—brain activation pattern 
causes homicidal behavior, having murdered affects brain activation, being incarcerated 
for a lengthy time affects brain activations, or something else entirely.
93
 
¶35 At least a few scholars have cautioned that the use of neuroscience in treating youth 
as being in a ―natural state‖ of diminished capacity must not ―further erode the already 
limited rights of adolescents instead of strengthening them.‖
94
  Scholar Stephen Mintz 
agrees that legal experts have tended to emphasize young people‘s deficiencies in recent 
years, invoking brain science to conclude that youth are less competent decision-makers, 
have less formed characters, and are more susceptible to peer pressure than adults.  Yet, 
he argues, history, sociology and cognitive science have shown that ―young people are, in 
general, much more competent, resilient, adaptable, and knowledgeable at far earlier ages 
than we previously assumed.‖
95
  In using a developmental framework for understanding 
children‘s rights then, advocates embrace the idea that youth are competent and capable, 
while also recognizing the need to guide them in their ongoing exploration, identity 
formation and consequent decision-making.  Arguments for lesser culpability should 
avoid damage to notions of youth competence, and vice versa.  
B. Science and Race 
¶36 Technology is unlikely to reveal what constitutes a normal brain.96  Stanford 
University biologist Robert Sapolsky regards such projects as politically and 
scientifically worrisome, noting that ―efforts to identify normal and abnormal brains have 
been responsible for some of the darkest movements in the history of science and 
technology, from phrenology to eugenics.‖
97
  Sapolsky‘s cautionary reference to dark 
scientific movements raises a related, second objection to the use of neuroscience in the 
juvenile justice context.  Again, the context is that youth of color are disproportionately 
over-represented at every stage of the system from stops, arrests and detentions to 
transfers, convictions and incarceration.
98
  With racial stereotypes afloat and numbers 
seemingly to back them up, the use of neuroscience to explain cognitive and behavioral 
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―deficiencies‖ in a criminal context poses an inherent risk of reinforcing associations 
between cognitive maturity and criminality, and race. 
¶37 Indeed, the proof is in the pudding.  Racialized studies on brains and intelligence 
have a long history dating back to the nineteenth century.  Physician Samuel George 
Morton, for example, collected skulls of various races and compiled extensive data about 
brain sizes to create a racial hierarchy of intelligence.
99
  In the late nineteenth century 
Europe, Paul Broco, a professor of clinical surgery who founded the Anthropological 
Society of Paris in 1859, continued to develop ―craniometry‖ to argue that the size of a 
brain bore a strong relationship to intelligence, and that black people tended to have 
smaller brains and were therefore intellectually and socially inferior to white people.
100
  
Nineteenth century milieu certainly did not lend itself to questioning racial hierarchies, as 
leaders and institutions set the tone for accepting white supremacy; Abraham Lincoln, for 
instance, proclaimed, ―[t]here is a physical difference between the white and black races 
which I believe will forever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and 
political equality.‖
101
  Such science mixed with social attitudes to help fuel a eugenics 
movement that sought to improve the human population by discouraging reproduction 
among persons with genetic defects or undesirable inheritable traits.   
¶38 Biologically deterministic and racialized science continues to find modern 
permutations.  In 1994, Harvard psychologist Richard J. Herrnstein and American 
Enterprise Institute political scientist Charles Murray published Bell Curve: Intelligence 
and Class Structure in American Life, in which they argued that racial differences in 
intelligence, as measured by IQ tests, are genetic.
102
  In 2009, a study discovered a 
―warrior‖ gene associated with gang-banging; its accompanying picture in one news 
release shows five fierce-looking boys of color, chests glistening, faces hardened, with 
masked, armed soldiers towering behind them—linking race to criminality through 
loaded imagery.
103
  Indeed, the search for genetic and biological explanations is on the 
rise, with studies claiming to locate areas of the brain responsible for addiction, violence, 
wisdom and even morality.
104
  
¶39 To be sure, adolescent brain science does not by itself lead to conclusions about 
race and intelligence, incapacity or dangerousness.  The context—of a juvenile and 
criminal justice system disproportionately populated by people of color, a history of 
racialized science and eugenics, and pre-existing associations between race and 
                                                 
99
 See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, MISMEASURE OF MAN 82 (1996).  Morton‘s study was eventually shown to be 
flawed; the study included skulls of white people that were all male and skulls of black people that were all 
female, which on average tended to be smaller in size. 
100
 Id. at 115. 
101
 Id. (citing Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858.) 
102
 RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN 
AMERICAN LIFE (1994).  The authors also cautioned though, ―both genes and the environment have 
something to do with racial differences.‖  Id. at 311. 
103
 Gang-Banging May Be Genetic, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 17, 1999. 
104
 Erikson, supra note 5, at 31 n.17 (citing Rita Z. Goldstein et al., Subjective Sensitivity to Monetary 
Gradients is Associated with Frontolimbic Activation to Reward in Cocaine Abusers, 87 DRUG & ALCOHOL 
DEPENDENCE 233 (2007)); Thomas W. Meeks & Dilip V. Jeste, Neurobiology of Wisdom, 66 ARCHIVES 
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 355 (2009); Andreas Meyer-Lindenberg et al., Neural Mechanisms of Genetic Risk for 
Impulsivity and Violence in Humans, 103 PROC. NAT‘L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 6269 (2006); Adrian Raine & 
Yaling Yang, Neural Foundations to Moral Reasoning and Antisocial Behavior, 1 SOC. COGNITIVE & 
AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 203 (2006).  
Vol. 6:2] Patricia Soung 
443 
dangerousness, incapacity and blameworthiness—is enough to create wariness of brain 
science.  Imagine presenting pictures of frontal lobes in honorable defense of black and 
brown youth, in a society that has too often associated them with inborn criminality and 
inferior mental aptitude.  Despite what actual explanations are given about the science, 
the impressions left by the image are distasteful—the convergence of science and racism 
may create a racialized pathology of criminality.  Perception of biological difference will 




¶40 Both youth and race are social constructs susceptible to varying interpretations and 
understandings.  The two dimensions of identity combine to create different narratives of 
why youth end up in the juvenile and criminal justice systems.  The policy implications 
are clear.  Under a banner of punishment and individual responsibility, the priority is to 
contain and control youth who go bad or are inherently deficient or dangerous.  Under a 
treatment and rehabilitation model, more room may be available to address the complex 
roots of delinquency and crime, and account for the interplay between individuals and 
environment. 
¶41 Adolescent neuroscience may in particular be harmful to a project of addressing the 
needs of youth altogether and youth of color in particular.  Explicit and implicit racial 
discrimination have a long history.  Unconsciously or consciously, such racial biases 
have literally colored biological studies about intellect and criminality before; on this 
historical stage, adolescent neuroscience is susceptible to differential interpretation and 
application to perpetuate racial biases.  In a sense, social constructs of youth and race 
overlay the interpretation of ―objective‖ science.  What emerges is yet another social 
construct rather than hard proof of what ―youth‖ means in the context of juvenile justice 
reform. 
¶42 Though social science studies examining the environment of youth are equally 
prone to racially biased interpretations, the attention in such studies can and should 
consider the structural inequities and injustices that steer youth, especially youth of color, 
down wayward paths.  That system-involved youth and youth of color disproportionately 
grow up in neighborhoods that are heavily policed and rife with guns, drugs, violence, 
underperforming public schools and depressed economies begs examination of context 
and corresponding policy solutions.  Brain imaging and other biology-based studies about 
crime and violence may add some force to arguments for greater leniency towards and 
protection of youth.  But over-reliance on such science may also fuel dangerous notions 
of inherent racial inferiority and dangerousness.  Adolescent neuroscience can be too 
comfortable a crutch for avoiding a deep look at the environments and institutions of 
youth, in particular youth of color.  Ultimately, the conclusions and impressions of the 
research are too incomplete, too easy and too suggestive. 
¶43 Certainly, youth, of whatever race, who commit acts of delinquency and crime 
should not be let off the hook.  Even where life circumstances condition or predispose a 
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youth towards breaking the law, or at least to being caught for doing so, society may 
rightly hold the youth accountable for their actions.  Where the harm inflicted is severe, 
so too must the punishment. But by the same token, society should not let itself off the 
hook either.  Amidst stern insistence that youth be held accountable, especially for 
serious crimes and repeat offending, we must ask whether the justice system furthers its 
stated goals of retribution, rehabilitation and deterrence effectively and proportionately.  
Where have youth gone wrong and where have we collectively, as a community, gone 
wrong with youth are two sides of the same question concerning crime and violence.  
Asking such questions should be both age and race conscious. 
